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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of the Order of the Supreme Court of Utah dated 
February 16, 1995, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993 Cum. 
Sup.). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellee, Pioneer Valley Hospital, submits the 
following issues to be determined on appeal: 
A. As to Ms. Nester's medical negligence claim, did 
the trial court properly enter summary judgment when Ms. Nester 
failed to produce any expert testimony regarding the performance 
of three-phrase bone scans using the isotope Tc99m? 
The standard of review for this issue is that 
applicable to questions of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Durham 
v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). See also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989) . 
B. As to Ms. Nester's informed consent claim, did the 
trial court properly enter summary judgment because Ms. Nester 
failed to produce expert testimony regarding three-phase bone 
scans using the isotope Tc99m? 
The standard of review for this question is that 
applicable to questions of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Durham 
v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 
P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). See also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1989) . 
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C. As to Ms. Nester's res ipsa loquitur claim, did 
the trial court properly enter summary judgment because Ms. 
Nester failed to produce any expert testimony regarding three-
phase bone scans using the isotope Tc99m? 
The standard of review for this question is that 
applicable to questions of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Durham v. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
281 (Utah App. 1987). See also Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative on the informed 
consent issue. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed 
consent — Proof required of patient — Defenses — consent to 
health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider it shall be presumed that 
what the health care provider did was either expressly 
or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to 
recover damages from a health care provider in an 
action based upon the provider's failure to obtain 
informed consent, the patient must prove the following: 
(a) That a provider-patient relationship 
existed between the patient and health care 
provider; and 
(b) The health care provider rendered health 
care to the patient; and 
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries 
arising out of the health care rendered; and 
(d) The health care rendered carried with it 
a substantial and significant risk of causing the 
patient serious harm; and 
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(e) The patient was not informed of the 
substantial and significant risk; and 
(f) A reasonable, prudent person in the 
patient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully 
informed as to all facts relevant to the decision 
to give consent. In determining what a 
reasonable, prudent person in the patient's 
position would do under the circumstances, the 
finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the 
patient before health care was provided and before 
the occurrence of any personal injuries alleged to 
have arisen from said health care; and 
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal 
injuries suffered by the patient. (Emphasis 
added.) 
(See Addendum A.) 
The medical negligence and res ipsa loquitur claims are 
governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 56. (See Addenda A and B to Brief of 
Appellant.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, 
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital. The plaintiff, 
Ms. Nester, claimed personal injuries arising from a three-phase 
bone scan performed on her at Pioneer Valley Hospital during 
which approximately 1.04 ccs of isotope Tc99m was injected into 
her left arm along with approximately 2 ccs of saline solution. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Ms. Nester filed her Complaint on January 28, 1993. 
Approximately one year and four months later, plaintiff filed her 
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"Certification of Readiness for Trial," specifically stating that 
"counsel has completed all discovery." 
After she had certified readiness for trial, the Court 
held a scheduling conference on June 2, 1994, at which time the 
case was set for a two-day non-jury trial on September 13, 1994. 
(R. 43, HH 1-3.) 
Thereafter, on July 5, 1994, Ms. Nester filed her 
initial designation of witnesses, listing Dr. LaVerne S. Erickson 
(a neurosurgeon) and Dr. Craig D. Campbell (a chiropractor) as 
the only intended witnesses with any medical background at all. 
(R. 45-46.) 
Thereafter, Pioneer Valley Hospital filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on July 21, 1994 (see R. 59-73), which motion 
the Court granted by minute entry dated 8-18-94, and by a formal 
"Summary Judgment" dated September 2, 1994. (R. 114-118.) 
Ms. Nester also failed to timely file any memorandum in 
opposition to Pioneer Valley Hospital's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and failed to contest any facts either by affidavit, or 
by stating a contrary version of facts in her memorandum. The 
hospital served its Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Nester's 
counsel by mail on July 20, 1994. (R. 59, 61.) Ms. Nester moved 
for enlargement of time on July 28, 1994, but there is no record 
that this motion was granted by the Court. (R. 88-89.) 
Therefore, on August 4, 1994, the hospital filed a notice to 
submit its Motion for Summary Judgment for decision. (R. 94-95.) 
Ms. Nester filed a second motion for enlargement of time on 
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August 8, 1994, but again there is no record that the Court 
granted this motion—and indeed, no extension of time was ever 
granted to Ms. Nester by the Court. (R. 96.) Finally, on August 
15, 1994, Ms. Nester hand-delivered her Memorandum in Opposition 
(styled "Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment") to the hospital's counsel. The hospital filed its 
Reply Memorandum on August 17, 1994, and the judge ruled on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment the next day (without hearing oral 
argument, since trial was scheduled to begin in less than thirty 
days—on September 13, 1994.) (R. 43 11 1; R. 114.) 
Ms. Nester thereafter timely appealed. (R. 123.) 
Statement of Facts. 
The following facts were never disputed at the trial 
court level, and are the uncontroverted facts for purposes of 
appeal. (See R. 102—Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, containing no contradictory statement of 
facts or opposing affidavits): 
1. Dr. Mark Greene prepared a prescription order, 
dated January 29, 1991, ordering a "3-phase bone scan" for Ms. 
Nester. (R. 84 H 9.) Mr. John Edward Bratke performed the 
isotope bone scan on Ms. Nester at Pioneer Valley Hospital on 
January 30, 1991. (R. 84 11 9.) 
2. When Ms. Nester reported to the radiology 
department for her test, Mr. Bratke asked her if she was either 
pregnant or breast feeding, which she denied. (R. 84, H 10.) 
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3. Mr. Bratke prepared the patient and injected 
approximately 1.04 ccs of the isotope, 25.3 mCi of Tc99m tagged 
2MMA, into the left arm, with approximately 2 ccs or less of 
saline as a flush. (R. 84, U 11.) 
4. Ms. Nester was instructed to drink large amounts 
of liquid to clear out the isotope from the soft tissue and to 
return in two and one half to three hours in order to complete 
the bone scan, since the isotope needs to be absorbed into the 
bones over that period of time. (R. 85, U 15.) 
5. As of January 30, 1991, Mr. Bratke had been 
director of Nuclear Medicine at Lakeview Hospital since 1977, and 
had been chief technologist for nuclear medicine at Pioneer 
Valley Hospital since 1985; he was (and is) a board-certified 
nuclear medicine technologist (R. 82-83 1JH 2, 3, 4, and 6.) 
6. On April 25, 1994, Ms. Nester filed her 
Certification of Readiness for Trial, through her attorney, J. 
Douglas Kinateder, certifying "that in his judgment, this case is 
ready for trial . . . " (R. 64, U 3.) 
7. Ms. Nester's attorney stated, in support of such 
certification, inter alia: 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery, 
that opposing counsel have had reasonable time to 
pursue discovery; and that all discovery of record has 
been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or 
required, copies of all existing medical reports have 
been made available to all counsel or parties or [sic] 
record. 
(R. 64, U 4.) 
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8. Pursuant to the Scheduling Order and Trial Notice 
issued by the trial court on June 2, 1994, Ms. Nester was 
required to file its witness/exhibit list by July 5, 1994. (R. 
64, H 5.) 
9. She sent by facsimile transmission plaintiff's 
initial designation of witnesses and list of exhibits, dated July 
5, 1994. (R. 65, H 6.) 
10. She has failed to name an expert nuclear medicine 
technologist who is qualified or competent to testify that 
Pioneer Valley Hospital was negligent as alleged. (R. 65, U 7.) 
11. The hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
supported by the affidavit of John Edward Bratke, an expert 
nuclear medicine technologist, to the effect that the appropriate 
standard of care was not breached in this case. This affidavit 
was never refuted. (R. 65, 1f 8; R. 82-87; R. 102-104.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment is at issue in this case. The appellate court reviews a 
grant of summary judgment applying the same standard as the trial 
court. Since summary judgment determines, by definition, only 
questions of law, the appellate court reviews the trial court's 
determination of law for correctness. 
Point II. The law of Utah consistently holds that, in 
a medical malpractice cause of action, plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case of negligence (standard of care, breach of that 
standard, and proximate causation) by expert testimony. Utah law 
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has consistently held that on summary judgment, a defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, if supported by an expert affidavit, 
will be granted unless a plaintiff comes forward with the 
affidavit of an expert alleging specific facts to support the 
disputed elements of the prima facie case. In this case, 
contrary to Utah law, Ms. Nester has failed to produce any 
affidavit of any expert to contradict the hospital's properly 
supported motion for summary judgment. 
The general rule under Utah law is that plaintiff must 
come forward, at summary judgment, with the affidavit of an 
expert in the same specialty as the defendant physician. There 
is an exception to this rule if plaintiff lays the foundation 
that plaintiff's expert is knowledgeable in and familiar with the 
standard of care in defendant's medical specialty. In this case, 
Ms. Nester failed to produce any affidavit whatsoever, let alone 
an affidavit establishing that her expert was familiar with the 
standard of care in the defendant's field of practice. 
Ms. Nester's request that she be allowed to establish 
her expert's foundation at trial rather than on summary judgment 
is contrary to Utah law. Utah cases have consistently upheld a 
grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff who fails to 
produce an adequate foundation at the summary judgment stage. 
through the affidavit of an expert, when defendant's motion is 
properly supported by the affidavit of an expert. 
Point III. To make out a claim for lack of informed 
consent against a medical practitioner, a plaintiff must prove 
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all of the elements of the informed consent statute, U.C.A. 
§ 78-14-5(1)(a)-(g). A plaintiff must produce expert testimony 
to support an informed consent claim to establish the materiality 
of the risks of which the patient was or was not informed. In 
this case, Ms, Nester failed to produce any expert testimony, by 
affidavit or otherwise, addressing the materiality of the risks 
of which she was or was not informed. 
Point IV. Under Utah law, mere invocation of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not sufficient to avoid summary 
judgment. In claims for medical malpractice, an undesired result 
produced by a medical procedure might appear to a lay person to 
be caused by negligence, when in fact no negligence occurred. 
Thus, expert testimony is almost always necessary to establish 
the foundation for a legitimate res ipsa loquitur inference. 
When the health care rendered lies within the knowledge of 
experts, expert testimony is necessary to establish the incident 
was more likely than not caused by negligence. In rare cases, as 
when a foreign object such as a sponge or needle is left in the 
body, the negligence is obvious to a lay person so that no expert 
testimony is required. However, a complaint of pain during 
performance of a three-phase bone scan, accompanied by injections 
of radioactive isotopes, is not obviously negligent. Injections 
hurt, and it takes an expert to say whether the pain was more 
than expected, or not. 
Point V. Ms. Nester's "Answer to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment" was also deficient on procedural grounds: 
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it was not timely, and it contained no affidavit or specific 
facts to contradict the affidavit produced in the hospital's 
motion for summary judgment. When confronted by the hospital's 
motion for summary judgment, which was properly supported by 
affidavit, Ms. Nester was not allowed to rest on the mere 
allegations of her Complaint, but was required to come forward 
with specific facts. This she failed to do. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate 
court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Maraetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Brigqs v. 
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987). Inasmuch as a challenge 
to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, 
because by definition summary judgment does not resolve factual 
issues, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II 
AS TO MS. NESTER'S MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CLAIM. THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE 
SHE FAILED TO PRODUCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF ANY EXPERT. 
A. The Burton v. Younablood Case Does Not Require the Court To 
Wait Until The Close of Evidence To Enter Summary Judgment. 
The sole authority on which Ms. Nester relies for this 
point is Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 1985). 
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However, she misreads this case. The passage of dicta which she 
cites speculating about what would have happened "had Burton's 
counsel laid adequate foundation" says nothing about when such 
foundation must be laid. 711 P.2d at 247. Although the Burton 
case did not involve a summary judgment, it did involve a 
dismissal of plaintiff's claim as a matter of law, and that 
dismissal was affirmed on appeal as a matter of law. Since 
summary judgment also determines questions of law, the same rule 
holds true in Ms. Nester's case, and summary judgment should be 
affirmed because she in fact did not present an adequate 
foundation, nor indeed any foundation at all, for her claim of 
medical negligence. 
Moreover, many other cases under Utah law have affirmed 
grants of summary judgment for failure to produce an adequate 
expert affidavit at a pretrial summary judgment motion. See Hunt 
v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (affirming a motion for 
summary judgment granted by Judge J. Dennis Frederick); Martin v. 
Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 (Utah App. 1987) (the Court of Appeals, 
per Judge Bench, affirmed the grant of summary judgment); 
Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 
App. 1987) (the Court, per Judge Greenwood, affirmed the grant of 
summary judgment); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 
P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987) (the Court, per Judge Jackson, 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment). 
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B. In a Medical Malpractice Claim. A Plaintiff Must Establish 
Duty, Breach, And Proximate Cause Bv the Use of Expert 
Testimony, 
The requirements for proving a medical malpractice 
cause of action are clearly established in the State of Utah. As 
noted by the Utah Supreme Court: 
The general rule is that a person asserting a 
medical malpractice claim must prove (1) the standard 
of care required of physicians under similar 
circumstances practicing in the same field or 
specialty, (2) that the applicable standard of care was 
breached, (3) that the injury to the plaintiff was 
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, and 
(4) that damages occurred as a result of defendant's 
breach of duty. 
Dallev v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 195 
(Utah 1990) (citations omitted). See also Martin v. Mott, 744 
P.2d 237, 338 (Utah App. 1987); Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). 
It is similarly well established that in medical 
malpractice cases, as a general rule, expert testimony is 
required to establish duty, breach, and causation. The Dallev 
court stated the rule as follows: 
To establish the standard of care required of a 
physician in a particular field, breach of that 
standard, and proximate cause, the plaintiff is 
generally required to produce an expert witness who is 
acquainted with the standard of care in the same or a 
similar field as the defendant doctor. 
791 P.2d at 195-96 (emphasis added). See also, Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348, 352 (Utah 1980); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah App. 1988); Martin, at 388; Hoopiiaina, at 721; Robinson, 
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at 264-53. Accord, Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 
1985); Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 P.2d 216 (1943); 
Edwards v. Clark, 96 Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938); Baxter v. 
Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 57 (1931). Expert testimony is 
required because the complex, technical nature of modern medical 
science is outside "the common knowledge and experience of the 
layman." Nixdorf, at 352; Chadwick, at 821. 
The only situation in which expert testimony is not 
required is when (as in the case of leaving a needle inside a 
surgery patient) the negligence is so obvious to a lay person 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Dalley, at 196; 
Nixdorf, at 352; Chadwick, at 821; Martin, at 338; Robinson, at 
264. (This issue is addressed in Point IV, infra.) In short, 
expert testimony is absolutely required in medical malpractice 
cases unless res ipsa loquitur is alleged; if res ipsa loquitur 
is alleged, expert testimony is still generally required to 
demonstrate that the incident more likely than not was a result 
of negligence. Nixdorf, at 352-53. 
A party's failure to present expert medical testimony 
is fatal to the plaintiff's cause of action. See Chadwick v. 
Nielsen, 763 P.2d at 821. 
Moreover, even if an expert affidavit is submitted, an 
affidavit which fails to counter or contradict the affidavit 
offered by the party moving for summary judgment is insufficient 
to avoid summary judgment. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1310 
(Utah 1993) ("the affidavit [of plaintiff's expert] in no way 
-13-
counters or contradicts the opinion of Dr. Johnson [defendant's 
expert affiant] that an earlier diagnosis . . . would not have 
permitted earlier treatment.") 
The foregoing rule, from Arnold v. Curtis, is 
particularly important in this case. The undisputed testimony of 
defendant's expert is as follows: 
19. On the basis of my personal knowledge and 
review of the applicable records described above, it is 
my opinion that my performance of the bone scan, 
including the injection of the isotope in question on 
Judith Nester on January 30, 1991, complied in all 
respects with the standard of professional care . . . 
20. It is further my opinion that despite 
reasonable and prudent care on the part of a nuclear 
medical technologist injecting the small amount of 
isotopes in connection with the bone scans, 
extravasation of some of the substance outside of the 
vein can occur which can cause pain, bruising and some 
soreness in the region. 
21. Despite that result, the risk of complication 
of a permanent nature is remote and not substantial and 
significant. Pain, soreness and bruising following the 
injection of this type does not indicate a breach of 
the standard of care or that the procedure was not 
properly performed. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 86.) Ms. Nester has alleged that she experienced pain 
immediately after the injection. However, injections are 
inherently painful, no matter how carefully performed. The 
injection of radioactive isotopes, and the procedures for 
conducting a three-phase bone scan, are not within the knowledge 
and experience of the normal lay person, and it would take an 
expert to say whether the facts alleged in this case amounted to 
negligence. 
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The only expert testimony of record in this case is the 
expert testimony that there was no breach of the standard of 
care, and that pain can result even if the procedure is done 
properly. Ms. Nester has provided no expert testimony which 
would contradict this opinion. Therefore, entry of summary 
judgment was proper. 
C. The Expert Testimony Must Be From One Who Is Competent As An 
Expert In The Same Field As The Defendant. 
Ms. Nester has framed the issues in her appeal very 
narrowly—namely, that summary judgment was improper merely 
because she did not provide the affidavit of a nuclear medicine 
technician. However, this obscures the larger fact that she 
provided no affidavit whatsoever to oppose the motion for summary 
judgment. In any event, lack of an affidavit from a nuclear 
medicine technician is still fatal to Ms. Nester's claim. 
Summary judgment in favor of a medical malpractice 
defendant is appropriate where plaintiff fails to establish the 
standard of care and breach of that standard through an expert 
who is competent to testify concerning the standard of care 
applicable to defendant's medical specialty. In order to 
establish the competency of an expert witness, the plaintiff must 
show that the expert is a member of the defendant's particular 
medical specialty or school—or must demonstrate that the 
standard of care of the expert's different specialty is common to 
both specialties. See Burton v. Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 
(Utah 1985); see also. Green v. Thomas, 662 P.2d 491, 493, 
(Colorado App. 1982) quoted in Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 339 
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(Utah App. 1987) ("The party offering the witness must establish 
the witness' knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care 
and treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the 
defendant's specialty.") 
Attempts by plaintiff to defeat summary judgment by 
designating a medical doctor as an expert witness have proved 
unsuccessful where the expert is incompetent, as demonstrated by 
the facts of Martin v. Mott, supra.. In that case, the plaintiff 
designated a medical doctor as an expert witness relating to 
misdiagnosis by a podiatrist. Plaintiff's expert medical doctor 
testified that he was unfamiliar with the standard of care 
expected of podiatrists, but that in his opinion, if the 
defendant were a physician, he would consider him in violation of 
the standard of care. The Utah Court of Appeals found that the 
plaintiff "clearly failed to establish by expert testimony the 
standard of care applicable to podiatrists such as defendant." 
Because of this, plaintiff's expert "clearly was not competent to 
testify as to any breach of such standard," and summary judgment 
was affirmed. Id., 744 P.2d at 339. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently reiterated this 
requirement. In the case of Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943 (Utah 
App. 1994), Judge Greenwood presented the opinion of a unanimous 
panel that an expert in the field of emergency room medicine was 
not competent to serve as an expert against a cardiologist. The 
court held as follows: 
Therefore, as Dr. Bushnell's specialty is not the 
same as Dr. Osborn's, Dr. Bushnell must establish that 
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he was knowledgeable before being retained as an expert 
witness about the standard of care in Dr. Osborn's 
specialty of cardiology or that the standard of care 
for emergency room physicians is the same as 
cardiologists. Dr. Bushnell failed to establish in his 
affidavit that he had sufficient knowledge regarding 
the appropriate standard of care prior to his review of 
the documents. Furthermore, he has not established 
that the standard of care for emergency room physicians 
is the same as for cardiologists. Accordingly, we 
affirm the trial court's decision that summary judgment 
was appropriate in this case. 
881 P.2d at 947-48. In summary, a physician from another 
specialty is not absolutely barred from serving as an expert, but 
the foundation must be laid before testimony is submitted. In 
this case, Ms. Nester never made any attempt to supply the trial 
court with the foundation necessary to avoid summary judgment. 
D. In A Medical Malpractice Case, The Foundation For An Expert 
Affidavit Establishing The Standard of Care Must Be Provided 
At The Time of Summary Judgment. 
Ms. Nester asserts, without the benefit of supporting 
authority, that she should be allowed to lay the foundation for 
an expert opinion at trial, rather than on summary judgment. 
This position is contrary to Utah law. 
In the case of Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 (Utah App. 
1987), Judge Bench delivered the opinion of a unanimous court 
affirming a grant of summary judgment for lack of proper 
foundation. In the Martin case, the plaintiff's allegation was 
very similar to the allegation made here—that her expert, a 
physician, was qualified to testify as an expert witness in all 
fields of medicine when certain types of procedures were at 
issue. The Court specifically rejected this analysis, holding: 
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To establish this foundation and thereby qualify a 
witness as an expert on the applicable standard of care 
"the party offering the witness must establish the 
witness's familiarity with the standard of care and 
treatment commonly practiced by physicians engaged in 
the defendant's specialty." . . . As plaintiff's 
evidence failed to raise a material issue of fact as to 
negligence, summary judgment was appropriate. 
744 P.2d at 339. 
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically noted that 
affidavits of experts are insufficient to defeat summary judgment 
unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their opinions 
and conclusions. King v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 832 P.2d 
858, 864, n.2 (Utah 1992). The Utah Supreme Court stated that 
"the major purpose of summary judgment is 'to avoid unnecessary 
trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the 
fact-finder.'" King, 832 P.2 864 n.2. Other cases have also 
required the foundational facts for an expert opinion to be set 
forth at the time of summary judgment. See Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992) (expert's affidavit must assert 
specific facts to support the expert's conclusion); Burton v. 
Youngblood, 711 P.2d at 248 (foundation must be shown to avoid 
dismissal); Robinson v. IHC, 740 P.2d at 264-65 (plaintiff must 
make a foundational showing to create a genuine issue sufficient 
to avoid summary judgment.) Summary judgment has uniformly been 
affirmed when the foundation is inadequate at summary judgment. 
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E. Ms, Nester Failed to Meet These Standards At The Trial Court 
Level. 
Ms. Nester's position is essentially that although she 
failed to establish the proper foundation at summary judgment, 
she would be glad to do so if permitted to go to trial.1 
However, this position is contrary to Utah lawf as demonstrated 
above. 
Ms. Nester failed to provide the affidavit of any 
expert whatsoever at summary judgment. A review of her response 
to summary judgment, styled "Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Consent To Request For a Hearing" 
contains no opposing affidavits whatsoever. (R. 102-104.) 
She has also failed to mention any expert who would be 
competent to testify in the same field of expertise as the 
defendant. She claims, without benefit of any supporting expert 
affidavit, that she should be permitted to lay a foundation as to 
the competency of her witness, a neurologist named Dr. LaVerne 
Erickson. However, even the foundation which Ms. Nester proposes 
to lay at trial does not contradict the affidavit of defendant's 
expert that even when the disputed procedure is performed 
properly, pain and bruising may result—which is rather obvious, 
since an injection with a long, sharp needle is inherently 
painful. It would take an expert to say if Ms. Nester' complaint 
however, remanding this case for a trial would probably 
have little practical effect on the outcome. This case was 
scheduled for a bench trial, not a jury trial. Hence, remand to 
the trial court will merely result in factfinding by the same 
judge that granted summary judgment in the first place. 
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of pain was due to the ordinary, inherent character of an 
injection or was due to negligence. 
Finally, this foundation was not provided at summary 
judgment. As discussed above, in many cases (including cases in 
which an expert affidavit was actually furnished in response to 
the motion for summary judgment) the appellate courts have upheld 
motions for summary judgment when a proper foundational showing 
was not made at the summary judgment stage. That is clearly what 
happened in this case, and summary judgment should likewise be 
affirmed in this case. 
In view of Ms. Nester's filing of the Certification of 
Readiness, and of her designation of witnesses, she should be 
foreclosed from attempting to bring in additional experts to meet 
the required burden to prove the standard of care in this case. 
Because she has failed to provide any testimony from an expert 
competent to testify as to the proper standard of care for 
nuclear medicine technologists performing injections of 
radioactive isotopes in connection with three-phase bone scans, 
Ms. Nester's cause of action must fail and summary judgment 
should be affirmed in favor of Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
POINT III 
AS TO MS. NESTER'S INFORMED CONSENT CLAIM, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE 
SHE FAILED TO PRODUCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF ANY EXPERT. 
Ms. Nester's complaint might arguably contain a cause 
of action for informed consent; however, such a claim is, on its 
face, fatally deficient. (See R. 4-5, U 13(a).) 
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Under Utah law, in order for a patient to recover 
damages from a health care provider based upon the failure of the 
provider to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove all 
the elements of the informed consent statute. Burton v. 
Younqblood, 711 P.2d at 249. The informed consent statute 
requires proof of seven elements: 
(a) That a provider-patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider; and 
(b) The health care provider rendered health care 
to the patient; and 
(c) The patient suffered personal injuries 
arising out of the health care rendered; and 
(d) The health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the patient 
serious harm; and 
(e) The patient was not informed of the 
substantial and significant risk; and 
(f) A reasonable, prudent person in the patient's 
position would not have consented to the health care 
rendered after having been fully informed as to all 
facts relevant to the decision to give consent . . . ; 
and 
(g) The unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of the personal 
injuries suffered by the patient. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1992 Repl.) (emphases added). 
In the case of Chadwick v. Nielsen, the Utah Court of 
Appeals has stated (per Judge Orme) that the better reasoned 
cases from other jurisdictions hold: "expert testimony is 
required in cases alleging a lack of informed consent to prove 
the materiality of the risk involved." 763 P.2d at 821 n.4. For 
the reasons set forth in Point II, supra, any cause of action 
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alleging lack of informed consent must be dismissed, since Ms. 
Nester has failed to designate any competent medical expert able 
to say whether the risks of the isotope injection were so 
substantial a^ d material that Ms. Nester should have been told of 
them. 
Moreover, as established by the uncontradicted 
affidavit of Mr. Bratke, Ms. Nester's complaint of pain, soreness 
and bruising following the isotope injection does not indicate a 
breach of the standard of care or that the procedure was not 
properly performed. Mr. Bratke also stated in his unchallenged 
affidavit that "the risk of complication of a permanent nature is 
remote and not substantial and significant." (R. 86, 11 21.) 
Where the health care rendered does not carry a 
substantial and significant risk of causing serious harm to the 
patient, informed consent of the patient is not required. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1)(d). 
POINT IV 
AS TO MS. NESTER'S RES IPSA LOQUITUR CLAIM THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER BECAUSE 
SHE FAILED TO PRODUCE THE AFFIDAVIT OF ANY EXPERT. 
The "mere invoking" of res ipsa loquitur in response to 
a defendant's motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to 
create a material issue of fact. Otherwise, summary judgment 
would never be available to a defendant in a res ipsa loquitur 
case. King v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 863 
(Utah 1992) . 
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The Utah Supreme Court has observed that an undesired 
result resulting from a medical procedure might appear to have 
been caused by negligence when reviewed by a lay person, when in 
factf that is not the case. King, 832 P.2d at 862. 
"Accordingly, expert evidence is usually necessary to establish 
either direct evidence of malpractice or a foundation for a 
legitimate res ipsa inference," because the medical profession 
and its practice are removed from the knowledge and understanding 
of the average citizen. 832 P.2d at 862 (quoting Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980)). Moreover, expert 
testimony is still required to show that the incident was more 
likely than not caused by the negligence. Nixdorf, at 352-53. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that in order for a plaintiff to 
raise an issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment in the face of "particularized assertions in the 
movant's affidavit," the Court has ruled that "the res ipsa 
loquitur inference must be strong enough to survive a motion for 
directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case." King v. 
Searle, 832 P.2d at 862. Despite this mention about the close of 
the plaintiff's case, the King court held that the expert's 
affidavit was not sufficient to create a factual issue on the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine at the summary judgment stage. 832 P.2d 
at 864. 
Since the King case held that the affidavit of an 
expert was insufficient to raise a res ipsa loquitur issue 
sufficient to avoid summary judgment, it follows logically that 
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the complete absence of any expert affidavit is even less 
adequate to create a res ipsa loquitur issue. Therefore, summary 
judgment on this cause of action was likewise proper. 
Ae stated above, performance of three-phase bone scans 
accompanied by injection of radioactive isotopes is highly 
technical, and outside the experience of lay persons. It is not 
a proper subject of res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, all injections 
are inherently painful, and it would require expert testimony to 
say if this incident was out of the ordinary. 
POINT V 
MS. NESTER'S "ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT" WAS ALSO DEFICIENT ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS: IT 
WAS LATE. AND HAD NO COUNTERAFFIDAVITS. 
Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 which requires a 
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be 
filed within 10 days of the service of the motion. Through a 
stipulated extension, plaintiff had ample time in which to file 
her opposition memorandum by August 8, 1994. This was not done. 
No order of the Court or stipulation by the parties extended the 
time beyond the stipulated August 8th deadline for plaintiff's 
response. Therefore, Ms. Nester's response, entitled 
"Plaintiff's answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Consent to Request for Hearing" was late. 
Moreover, Ms. Nester failed to supply the trial court 
with any affidavit whatsoever to contradict the hospital's 
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properly supported Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 56(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in pertinent part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
its pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (emphasis added). The proffered, 
speculative foundation of plaintiff's counsel is inadequate to 
serve as expert testimony and is a self-serving attempt to 
establish a standard of care. Her efforts to avoid summary 
judgment do not meet the criteria established by Utah law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requires, first, an expert's affidavit to 
counter the affidavit submitted by defendant's expert. More 
importantly, the affidavit must contain specific facts, not "bare 
assertions" or opinions without sufficient foundation, to defeat 
summary judgment. See King v. Searle, 832 P.2d at 864 n.2; 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 103 (Utah 1992). 
Ms. Nester has failed, altogether, to establish by 
anything other than bare allegations by her attorney, that any 
harm which she suffered could not have occurred to her in the 
absence of negligence on the part of defendant. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) supports an entry of summary 
judgment because plaintiff's counsel has failed to produce an 
affidavit of a competent expert witness. Counsel has only made 
bare assertions of what plaintiff's witness, Dr. LaVerne S. 
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Erickson, a neurologist, might say. There is no proof, first of 
all, that Dr. Erickson has the requisite knowledge, training and 
ability to opine as to the proper standard of care of a nuclear 
medicine technologist. But, more importantly, plaintiff has 
failed even to attempt to establish by competent affidavit a 
genuine issue of material fact. Failure to establish by expert 
testimony the standard of care applicable to a nuclear medicine 
technologist requires summary judgment to be entered in favor of 
Pioneer Valley Hospital. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Nester claimed, at the trial court level, that she 
experienced pain after receiving an injection. The hospital 
moved for summary judgment, including an affidavit of an expert 
in nuclear medicine that pain can result from an isotope 
injection even when due care is being rendered. This makes good 
sense—it is often the case that being stuck with a needle hurts. 
Plaintiff has produced no affidavit from any expert to contradict 
this testimony. Nor is the expert which she would propose to use 
at trial an expert competent to discuss the standard of care and 
the causation issues associated with the injection of radioactive 
isotopes during the performance of a three-phase bone scan. 
Summary Judgment is proper when these affidavits are not produced 
in response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment. 
Ms. Nester's informed consent claim and res ipsa 
loquitur claims were also properly dismissed by the trial court 
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on summary judgment, because they too require an expert 
affidavit. 
For these reasons, and the analysis more fully set 
forth above, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was 
proper, and its decision should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 5? day of February, 
1995. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMI 
riD H. EBPERSON 
M. J&ITCHETT, JR. 
for Appellee 
Pioneer Valley Hospital 
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within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, whichever first oc-
curs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except 
that: 
(a) In an action where the allegation against 
the health care provider is that a foreign object 
has been wrongfully left within a patient'a body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the for-
eign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, 
whichever first occurs; and 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a pa-
tient has been prevented from discovering mis-
conduct on the part of a health care provider be-
cause that health care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged miscon-
duct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable dili-
gence, should have discovered the fraudulent 
concealment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all 
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disabil-
ity under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persona, 
partnerships, associations and corporations and to all 
health care providers and to all malpractice actions 
against health care providers based upon alleged per-
sonal injuries which occurred prior to the effective 
date of this act; provided, however, that any action 
which under former law could have been commenced 
atler the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within the unelapaed portion of time allowed 
under former law; but any action which under former 
law could have been commenced more than four years 
after the effective date of this act may be commenced 
only within four years after the effective date of this 
78-14-4.6. Amount of award reduced by 
amounts of collateral source* avail-
able to plaintiff— No reduction where 
subrogation right existe — Collateral 
sources defined — Procedure to pre-
serve aubrogation rights — Evidence 
admissible — Exceptions . 
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care 
providers as defined in Section 78 14-3 in which dam-
ages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for 
losses sustained, the court shsll reduce the amount of 
such award by the total of all amounts paid to the 
plaintiff from all collateral sources which are avail-
able to him; however, there shall be no reduction for 
collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists 
as provided in this section nor shall there be a reduc-
tion for any collateral payment not included in the 
award of damages. Upon a finding of liability and an 
awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court 
shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts 
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for 
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available 
to him. The court shall also take testimony of any 
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited 
by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his 
immediate family to secure his right to any collateral 
source benefit which he is receiving aa a result of his 
injury, and shall offset any reduction in the award by 
such amounts. No evidence ahall be received and no 
reduction made with respect to future collateral 
source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4). 
(2) For purposes of this section "collateral source" 
means paymente made to or for the benefit of the 
plaintiff for 
(a) medical expenses and disability payments 
payable under the United States Social Security 
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability 
act, or any other public program, except the fed-
eral programs which are required by law to seek 
subrogation; 
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability 
insurance, automobile accident insurance that 
provides health benefits or income disability cov-
erage, and any other similar insurance benefits, 
except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or 
provided by others; 
(c) any contract or agreement of any person, 
group, organization, partnership, or corporation 
to provide, pay for, or reimburse the coats of hos-
pital, medical, dental, or other health care ser-
vices, except benefits received as gifts, contribu-
tions, or assistance made gratuitously; and 
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continu-
ation plan provided by employers or any other 
system intended to provide wages during a period 
of disability. 
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts 
paid or received prior to settlement or judgment, a 
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30 
days before settlement or trial of the action a written 
notice upon each health care provider against whom 
the malpractice action has been asserted. The written 
notice shall state the name and address of the pro-
vider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral 
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons 
who received payment, and the items and purposes 
for which payment has been made. 
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs 
that provide payments or benefits available in the 
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the ex-
tent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to 
pay. Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that 
such programs, payments, or benefits will be avail-
able in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact 
may consider such evidence in determining the 
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future 
expenses. 
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to 
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health 
care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or 
entity as reimbursement for collateral source pay-
ments made prior to settlement or judgment, includ-
ing any payments made under Title 26, Chapter 19, 
except to the extent that subrogation rights to 
amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are 
preserved as provided in this section. All policies of 
insurance providing benefits affected by this section 
are construed in accordance with this section. ISM 
78-14-6. Failure to obtain informed consent — 
Proof required of patient — Defenses 
— Conaent to health care. 
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered 
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that 
what the health care provider did waa either ex-
pressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a pa-
tient to recover damages from s health care provider 
in an action based upon the provider's failure to ob-
tain informed conaent, the patient must prove the 
following: 
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(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed 
between the patient and health care provider, 
and 
(b) the health care provider rendered health 
care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries aris-
ing out of the health care rendered; and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a 
substantial and significant risk of causing the 
patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the sub-
stantial and significant risk; and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the pa-
tient's position would not have consented to the 
health care rendered after having been fully in-
formed as to all facta relevant to the decision to 
give consent. In determining what a reasonable, 
prudent person in the patient'a position would do 
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall 
use the viewpoint of the patient before health 
care was provided and before the occurrence of 
any personal injuries alleged to have arisen from 
said health care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care 
rendered was the proximate cause of personal in-
juries suffered by the patient. 
(21 It shall be a defense to any malpractice action 
against a health care provider based upon alleged 
failure to obtain informed conaent if: 
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the pa-
tient actually suffered was relatively minor; or 
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from 
the health care provider waa commonly known to 
the public; or 
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the 
health care complained of, that he would accept 
the health care involved regardless of the risk; or 
that he did not want to be informed of the mat-
ters to which he would be entitled to be informed; 
or 
<d) the health care provider, after considering 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used 
reasonable discretion as to the manner and ex-
tent to which risks were disclosed, if the health 
care provider reasonably believed that additional 
disclosures could be expected to have a substan-
tial and adverse effect on the patient'a condition; 
or 
(e) the patient or his representative executed a 
written consent which seta forth the nature and 
purpose of the intended health care and which 
contains a declaration that the patient accepts 
the risk of substantial and serious harm, if any, 
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficisl results of 
health care and which acknowledges that health 
care providers involved have explained his condi-
tion and the proposed health care in a satisfac-
tory manner and that all questions aaked about 
the health care and its attendant risks have been 
answered in a manner satisfactory to the patient 
or his representative; such written consent shall 
be a defense to an action against a health care 
provider based upon failure to obtain informed 
conaent unless the patient proves that the person 
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or 
shows by clear and convincing proof that the exe-
cution of the written conaent was induced by the 
defendant's affirmative acta of fraudulent mis-
representation or fraudulent omiasion to state 
material facta. 
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed 
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or over 
from refuaing to consent to health care for his own 
person upon personal or religious grounds. 
(4) The following persons are authorized and em-
powered to conaent to any health care not prohibited 
by law: 
(a) any parent, whether an adult or a minor, 
for his minor child; 
(b) any married person, for a spouse; 
(c) any person temporarily standing in loco pa-
rentis, whether formally serving or not, for the 
minor under his care and any guardian for his 
ward; 
(d) any person eighteen years of age or over for 
his or her parent who is unable by reason of age, 
physical or mental condition, to provide auch con-
aent; 
(e) any patient eighteen years of age or over, 
(f) any female regardless of age or marital sta-
tus, when given in connection with her preg-
nancy or childbirth; 
(g) in the absence of a parent, any adult for his 
minor brother or sister, and 
(h) in the absence of a parent, any grandpar-
ent for his minor grandchild. 
(5) No person who in good faith consents or autho-
rizes health care treatment or procedures for another 
as provided by this act shall be subject to civil liabil-
ity. ItTS 
78-14-6. Writing required aa baaia for liability 
for breach of guarantee , warranty , 
contract or aaaurance of r e s u l t 
No liability shall be imposed upon any health care 
provider on the basis of an alleged breach of guaran-
tee, warranty, contract or assurance of result to be 
obtained from any health care rendered unless the 
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance is set 
forth in writing and signed by the health care pro-
vider or an authorized agent of the provider. isre 
78-14-7. Ad damnum clauae prohibited in com-
plaint 
No dollar amount shall be specified in the prayer of 
a complaint filed in a malpractice action against a 
health care provider The complaint ahall merely 
pray for such damages as are reasonable in the prem-
ises ir7« 
78-14-7.1. Limitation of award of noneconomlc 
damages in malpractice actions. 
In a malpractice action against a health care pro-
vider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic 
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconve-
nience In no case shall the amount of damages 
awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000. 
This limitation does not affect awards of punitive 
damages. isea 
78-14-7.5. Limitation on attorney's contingency 
fee In malpractice action, 
(1) In any malpractice action against a health care 
provider as defined in Section 78-14-3, an attorney 
shall not collect a contingent fee for representing a 
client seeking damages in connection with or arising 
out of personal injury or wrongful death caused by 
the negligence of another which exceeds 33'/*% of the 
amount recovered. 
(2) This limitation applies regardless of whether 
the recovery is by settlement, arbitration, judgment, 
or whether appeal is involved. ISM 
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